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ABSTRACT
The subject of this discussion are the almost forgotten victims of chemical weapons 
on the Eastern Front of World War I. Source data related to military operations, in particu-
lar to the German gas attacks in the region of the Bzura and Rawka rivers, are the basis 
for presenting problems related to the estimation of the number of victims of poisonous 
chlorine gas in the period between May and July 1915. Using the example of selected data 
relating to the wave attack of May 31, 1915, I show the specificity and complexity of the 
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the countability of victims of chemical weapons. Indirectly, I show the need and legitimacy 
of systematizing and interpreting all available information on what resulted from the his-
torical use of chemical weapons. This would be conducive to deepening our knowledge 
about the fallen soldiers and their resting places. It would be helpful to initiate work on 
a digital repository of knowledge on the use of chemical weapons in the past, taking into 
account the very diverse descriptions of events and victims of chemical weapons from the 
Eastern Front of the Great War. Such a digitized resource could contribute to the systema-
tization of highly dispersed source data, their further interpretation and reinterpretation, 
and their social activation, for the benefit of deepening knowledge about history and his-
torical awareness and preventing the threat of again turning to the use of such weapons of 
mass destruction.
Key words: the Great War, Eastern Front, chemical weapon (CW), 1915, chlorine, fatal 
and non-fatal poisonings, estimation of the number of fatalities, resting places as memory 
triggers, war cemeteries, peace education, OPCW
STRESZCZENIE
Przedmiotem omówienia są zapomniane ofiary broni chemicznej na froncie wschod-
nim I wojny światowej. Dane źródłowe powiązane z działaniami zbrojnymi, w szczegól-
ności z niemieckimi atakami gazowymi w rejonie Bzury i Rawki, stanowią tu podstawę 
estymacji liczby ofiar trującego chloru z okresu między majem a lipcem 1915 r. Na przykła-
dzie zebranych danych odnoszących się do ataku falowego z dnia 31 maja 1915 r. ukazuję 
specyfikę i złożoność krytyki źródłowej w odniesieniu do liczby ofiar broni chemicznej. 
Pośrednio ukazuję przy tym potrzebę i zasadność systematyzacji oraz interpretacji wszel-
kich dostępnych informacji na temat tego, czym skutkowało stosowanie broni chemicznej 
(CW) w czasach minionych. Pomocne w tym byłoby zainicjowanie prac nad cyfrowym 
repozytorium wiedzy na temat użycia broni chemicznej w przeszłości z uwzględnieniem 
wydarzeń i ofiar z frontu wschodniego Wielkiej Wojny. Taki zdigitalizowany zasób mógł-
by się przyczynić do lokalizacji miejsc spoczynku ofiar broni masowego rażenia, do inte-
gracji danych źródłowych, a także ich wtórnych opracowań oraz do ich aktywizowania, na 
rzecz: pogłębiania wiedzy o dziejach i świadomości historycznej oraz zapobiegania zagro-
żeniu stosowania broni masowego rażenia.
Słowa kluczowe: Wielka Wojna, Front Wschodni, broń chemiczna (CW), 1915, chlor, 
zatrucia śmiertelne i inne niż śmiertelne, estymacja liczby ofiar, miejsca spoczynku jako 
wyzwalacze pamięci, cmentarze wojenne, edukacja dla pokoju, OPCW
INTRODUCTION
In the literature, it is stated that the number of victims poisoned as 
a result of the use of various types of chemical weapons during the First 
World War was over 1,250,000 soldiers. Of these, between 90,000 to 
100,000 people were poisoned fatally. From the perspective taken here, it 
is not clear whether the existing summaries of the total number of victims 
of chemical weapons included victims of gas attacks from the initiation 
phase of the mass-scale use of this type of weapon on the Eastern Front in 
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1915. An analysis of the literature on the subject relating to the Great War 
does not indicate that this is the case.
It is now assumed that attacks with the use of chemical weapons in 
1914–1918 accounted for from about 4% to 7.7% of fatalities in the Great 
War. Such conclusions can be drawn from the literature on the subject. The 
very wide spectrum of these estimates is an important incentive, if not for 
in-depth and comprehensive research, then at least for empathic reflection 
on the still inaccurately known, and perhaps even now uncountable, 
numbers of victims of weapons of mass destruction in the history of the 
world.
The problem of the number of victims of gas attacks launched by the 
German army in the area of the Łowicz-Błońsk Plain during the fighting 
for the Bolimów bridgehead in 1915 has previously been addressed rarely 
and fragmentarily1. In general, the total number of victims has been 
indicated without specifying the detailed source basis of these estimates. 
Losses were calculated mainly using German sources and schematic 
data from previous Russian studies were duplicated without seeking to 
correlate Russian and German data. Until now, the published studies have 
paid little attention to:
– to what extent it is reasonable to perceive the source data on the number 
of victims of chemical weapons as requiring additions and corrections, 
and thus questionable, and
– what method or methods should be used to systematize the resources 
of data (including source data) on the history of chemical weapons use, 
so that the knowledge about it is more accessible, can be shared and 
susceptible to further in-depth analyses, e.g., comparative and multi-
faceted investigations.
This article is an attempt to focus on these issues, to fill these gaps and 
provide a potential incentive for researchers to further investigate the 
problem of the still under-counted victims of chemical weapons. It is also 
1  The exceptions are the works cited below, especially А.Н. Де Лазари, Химическое 
оружие на фронтах Мировой войны 1914–1918 гг. Краткий иторич. очерк, Москва 1935, in 
which, however, the author did not refer to all gas attacks between May and July in the area 
of the fighting on the Rawka and Bzura. The numerical data collected by this researcher also 
function in the Polish-language literature on the subject. This includes, among others, in 
the list of losses in Russian regiments resulting from a gas attack between 31 May 1915 and 
3 June 1915 in: S. Kaliński, Od powołania do listy strat. Żołnierze armii niemieckiej i rosyjskiej 
w bitwie nad Rawką i Bzurą, w: Archeologiczne przywracanie pamięci o Wielkiej Wojnie w rejonie 
Rawki i Bzury (1914–1915), red. A.I. Zalewska, Warszawa 2019, s. 61, made on the basis of 
data collected by A. De Lazari (op. cit., s. 29). An important achievement in this regard are 




an argument for the need to initiate the creation of an online repository of 
all data available to us today that would aid exploring the problem of the 
use of chemical weapons in the past. It contains conclusions from a critical 
analysis of the existing written sources and studies relating to the use of 
chlorine as an active substance on 31 May 1915 on the Front in the area 
of the Bzura and Rawka rivers. This was the first mass-scale poison gas 
attack on the Eastern Front. 
Taking into account the considerable extent of the issue, the clear 
limitations in the possibility of specifying the exact number of victims of 
the use of chemical weapons during World War I, and different opinions 
on the possibilities and methodology of their calculation, it is rather 
impossible to fully cover the problem in a relatively short article. That 
is why I decided to present a very specific issue: the incompleteness and 
controversy surrounding the data on gas attacks, as well as the arguments 
in favour of the thesis that the victims of chemical weapons are impossible 
to be counted. At the same time, I indicate only those examples of source 
data that well illustrate the complexity of the issues discussed below. They 
have been selected from the source data that I have examined closely and 
critically analysed.
In this study, I will focus on one specific situation – the use of chlorine 
on a massive scale, in the initial phase of spreading the use of chemical 
weapons. For the clarity of the following, after highlighting the issues of 
a more general nature, the data that have been collected on the number 
of victims of chlorine poisoning has been broken down into five groups, 
though these sometimes have some overlap. First, I delineate the historical 
background of the analyzed problem. Next, I discuss references to the issue 
of the number of the victims of the attack of May 31st presented in studies 
that were created relatively shortly after the events concerned, i.e., in the 
1920s and 1930s.2 Then I discuss selected documents created directly in 
the course of hostilities, such as notes, reports, dispatches from the Front, 
chronicles. My aim is to confront and/or correlate the source data available 
in both the German and Russian archives. I also give voice to those who 
came into contact with the victims of the gas attacks shortly after they had 
2  In this article, it is not my intention to discuss the current state of research on the 
number of victims of gas weapons during World War I and its determinants. This very 
important issue deserves a separate in-depth study. This is an important and urgent task. 
It can be hoped that this gap has been filled with a publication in the description of which 
we read that in terms of the completeness and scope of the information provided, it is 
encyclopaedic: М.В. Супотницкий, В.А. Ковтун, С.В. Петров, Химическое оружие в Первой 
мировой войне, Москва 2020. Unfortunately, personally, I am still waiting impatiently for 
the opportunity to acquaint myself with the content of this book.
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taken place and left a trace of this experience in reports, journals, diaries, 
etc. To my knowledge, some of this source material is published and 
subjected to source criticism for the first time through this article. At the 
same time, despite the new data presented here on the topic under study, 
I do not claim that they allow us to obtain an „objective picture” of the 
first wave attacks with the use of chlorine on the Russian-German front. 
In my conclusions, I include the results of a new estimation of the number 
of victims of poisonous gases, taking into account those of 31 May 1915.
THE VICTIMS OF WAVE ATTACKS ON THE EASTERN FRONT IN THE AREA  
OF TODAY’S CENTRAL POLAND
The problem of the number of victims of chemical weapons on the 
Eastern Front of World War I, analogically to the problem of their final 
resting places, had remained until recently a relatively little known and 
poorly described topic. Both in the Polish literature on the subject3, and in 
foreign works4. Accounts of the victims of the first gas attacks carried out 
in May, June and July 1915 (particularly in accounts written in English) 
were treated relatively marginally5 and often with errors6. This marginality 
results, among other things, from the conviction, first of participants in 
those events, and then of historians, that the fate of the war was decided 
on the Western Front, and the Eastern Front played a supporting role7.
3  For example, Z. Bartel, Broń gazowa, Warszawa 1928; R. Umiastowski, Wśród 
trujących mgieł – opowieść o wojnie gazowej, Warszawa 1933; L. Konopski, Historia broni 
chemicznej, Warszawa 2009; S. Kaliński, Bolimów 1915, Warszawa 2015; A.I. Zalewska, 
Historia użycia przez armię niemiecką broni masowego rażenia (Massenwirkung) w rejonie Rawki 
i Bzury w styczniu 1915 roku, w: Archeologiczne, s. 99–112.
4  For example, П. Каратыгин, Газовая война, Харьков 1923; R. Hanslian, F. Bergen-
dorff, Der Chemische Krieg, Berlin 1925; Я.Л. Авиновицкий, Химия в системе современных 
вооружений империалистов, Москва 1936; J. Meyer, Der Gaskampf und die chemischen Kamp-
stoffe, Leipzig 1938; R. Hanslian, Vom Gaskrieg zum Atomkrieg, Stuttgart 1951, and also later 
works, for example O. Lepick, La Grande Guerre chimique 1914–1918, Paris 1998 where there 
are references to further literature. 
5  For example, I. Hogg, Bolimov and the First Gas Attack, w: Tanks and Weapons of World War, 
London 1973, s. 7–19; A.I. Zalewska, Relevant and Applied Archaeology. The Material Remains of the 
First World War: between „Foundational” and „Biographical” Memory, between „Black Archaeology” 
and „Conflict Archaeology”, „Sprawozdania Archeologiczne” 2013, 65, s. 9–49.
6  For example, the work of Ian Hogg includes information about an attack at Zduńska 
Wola, while the author probably meant Wola Szydłowiecka, Bolimów commune, see: 
A.I. Zalewska, Historia for details.
7  This is clear both in the memoirs of participants and direct witnesses, especially 
the decision makers of those events, as well as in later subject studies, for example, cf. 
M. Neiberg, D. Jordan, Front Wschodni 1914–1920. Od Tannenbergu do wojny polsko-
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The disproportions in the knowledge of military operations with the use 
of weapons of mass destruction on the Western and Eastern fronts are very 
clear. I am putting forward the thesis that the early post-war studies on the 
actions on both fronts, in which most of the attention was devoted to what 
was happening on the Western Front, had an impact that disadvantaged 
the state of knowledge about the latter. To this day, this translates into 
the (non) memory of the fallen of the Eastern Front (including the victims 
of chemical weapons8) of the Great War. While the memory of those who 
died on the Western Front is still cherished, this memory is in decline as far 
as the victims of the Eastern Front are concerned9. There are many reasons 
for this, the investigation of this situation has already been initiated both 
in historiography and in archaeology10.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND – PRIMARY CONTEXT
At the turn of 1914 and 1915, the eastern front stretched over a distance 
of 1,200 kilometres, of which almost 800 kilometres ran through the 
territory of today’s Poland. Many bloody battles were fought from East 
Prussia (today Warmia and Masuria), through Mazovia, the Łódź region, 
bolszewickiej, tłum. J. Kozłowski, Poznań 2010; P. Hart, I wojna światowa 1914–1918. Historia 
militarna, tłum. J. Szkudliński, Warszawa 2014.
8  The problematic nature of attempts to indicate the total number of victims of gas 
attacks on the Eastern Front was discussed, for example, in an article by Steven Main, who 
cited several times i.a. the calculations made in the 1920s and 1930s, pointing out the number 
of 65,000 gas casualties among the Russian army in 1915–1916, after: В.A. Меликов, 
Стратегическое развертывание, t. 1, Первая империалистическая война 1914–1918 гг.: (по 
опыту первой империалистической войны 1914–1918 гг. и гражданской войны в СССР), 
Москва 1939, s. 323. Cf., S.J. Main, Gas on the Eastern Front During the First World War (1915–
1917), „The Journal of Slavic Military Studies” 2015, 28, 1, s. 99–132. However, I would like 
to draw attention to the problem of duplicating errors in the description of historical facts, 
present e.g., in the same article by Main. For example, the author cites without comment the 
data contained in I. Hogg’s work and his fundamental errors regarding the tear gas attack 
in January 1915. At the same time, when describing the three wave (chlorine) gas attacks on 
the territory of Poland (i.e., 31 May, 6/7 July and 6 August 1915), unfortunately he completely 
omits (just like the Russian authors) the attack of 12 June 1915.
9  A.I. Zalewska, Relevant.
10  See, for example, W. Borodziej, M. Górny, P.T. Kwiatkowski, Znaki niepodległości. 
Święto 11 Listopada w Polsce i jego odpowiedniki w międzywojennej Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, 
„KLIO POLSKA. Studia i Materiały z Dziejów Historiografii Polskiej” 2018, 10, s. 171–199; 
A.I. Zalewska, D. Cyngot, Wpływ wojennych wydarzeń dziejowych (res gestae) i relacji o nich 
(historie rerum gestarum) na kondycję materialnych pozostałości po tych wydarzeniach. Studium 
przypadku na temat dziedzictwa konfliktów zbrojnych jako wyzwania poznawczego i społecznego, 
„Folia Praehistorica Posnaniensia” 2020, 25, s. 409–441, and further literature there.
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the lands around Kielce, to Lesser Poland and Subcarpathia. Unlike the 
Western Front, the Eastern Front had been moved since the autumn of 
1914. In 1914 and 1915, the battle line moved several hundred kilometres 
from the west to the east and from the east to the west. It was not until 
the winter of 1915 that the fighting sides got stuck in the trenches after 
various exhausting manoeuvring fights (the Łódź Operation). Before this 
happened, the German command – assessing the situation on the Eastern 
Front as disturbing – decided to hurriedly draw reinforcements from 
the Western Front (including from Ypres). The first troops arrived on the 
Eastern Front at the end of November 191411. When engaged in combat, 
they strengthened the 9th Army established in November 1914 and helped 
to capture Łódź, which the Russians left on 6 December 1914. At the same 
time, the Battle of Łowicz broke out, a continuation of the Łódź Operation 
and its final act12.
On 13 December 1914, the Russian High Command ordered the troops 
operating on the left bank of the Vistula River to withdraw13. They were 
to occupy new positions east of the Bzura, Rawka, Pilica and Nida rivers. 
The planned and orderly retreat under the pressure of effective offensive 
actions by the German army began on the night of 15/16 December, when 
some units of the 1st Army of the Russian Empire withdrew from Łowicz 
to the eastern bank of the Bzura River14. By 19 December, Russian troops, 
previously fighting near Łódź, took up new defensive positions on the 
eastern banks of the Bzura and Rawka rivers. The troops were weakened 
as a result of losses, and the soldiers were tired of several months of 
fighting. More than 100,000 soldiers of the Russian army had then been 
taken prisoner15. With the end of the Łódź Operation, later described as the 
largest manoeuvring battle in this war, tactical and operational movements 
were gradually being phased out on this part of the Eastern Front.
From December 1914, the tsarist army created defensive positions 
basing them, where possible, on natural terrain obstacles, including on 
the high eastern banks of the Rawka and Bzura rivers, flowing across 
the relatively flat terrain of the Łowicz-Błońska Plain. The defensive 
positions that they formed were located only about 60 km from the centre 
of Warsaw and the command of the Russian army had no doubts that 
11  J. Dąbrowski, Wielka Wojna 1914–1918, t. 1, Oświęcim 2015, s. 223 and 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart [dalej: HStAS] M 33/2 Bu 87.
12  See: G.K. Korolkow, Operacja Łódzka 1914. Najciekawsza batalia pierwszej wojny 
światowej, Oświęcim 2014.
13  Y. Danilov, La Roussie dans la guerre mondiale (1914–1917), Paris 1927, s. 334.
14  Ibidem; G.K. Korolkow, op. cit., s. 222.
15  Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau [dalej: BArch] PH 5-II/279.
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if the opponent overcame the section of the front between Sochaczew 
and Skierniewice, the road would be open not only to Warsaw, but also 
further to the east. Indeed, the German army quickly crossed both rivers 
and formed a bridgehead between Zakrzew (in the Sochaczew region) and 
the Mogiły farm (in the Bolimów region)16. From the Bolimów bridgehead, 
the Germans planned to launch an attack on Warsaw, and then further 
east. The first such attempt was made 31 January – 5 February17 during 
the winter battle of Bolimów18. At that time, the Germans concentrated fire 
from as many as 600 artillery pieces on a several-kilometre section of the 
front. The possibility of conducting such an intense artillery strike was 
then unique on the Eastern Front, as was the multiple use, for the first time 
in history on a mass scale, of at least 18,000 projectiles releasing irritating 
and tear-inducing substances19. The Russian army, however, repelled 
the attacks at the cost of large casualties20, losing some positions, but not 
allowing the front line to be breached.
GAS CLOUD ATTACKS ON THE EASTERN FRONT
After the failure of the winter attempts by the German troops to break 
free from the ties of the trench warfare, the military decision-makers 
responsible for military operations on the eastern front were open to 
„more effective” combat solutions. From April 1915, on both fronts of 
the Great War, the Germans began to open more and more the lid of the 
deadly „Pandora’s box” of chemical warfare. After opening it, along with 
16  See details in: A.I. Zalewska, J. Czarnecki, Zastój na całej linii. Historia przejścia od 
wojny manewrowej do pozycyjnej na przyczółku bolimowskim (1914/1915), w: Archeologiczne, 
s. 27–42.
17  The justification for the completely innovative thesis that the attacks with gas 
missiles were carried out by the Germans in the area of Rawka and Bzura not only once 
(on January 31, as is generally accepted and repeated in the literature on the subject), but 
many times, has been discussed elsewhere, see: A.I. Zalewska, J. Czarnecki, Conflict Gas-
scape: Chemical weapons on the Eastern Front, January 1915, w: Conflict Landscapes Materiality 
and Meaning in Contested Places, red. N.J. Saunders, P. Cornish, Routledge 2021, s. 66–84.
18  A.I. Zalewska, J. Czarnecki, Ślady i świadectwa Wielkiej Wojny nad Rawką i Bzurą, 
Warszawa 2016, s. 35.
19  E. Ludendorff, Moje wojenne wspomnienia, t. 1, 1914–1916, Warszawa 2014, s. 107.
20  According to the study Strategic outline of the war, only in the section occupied by 
the Russian 6th Army Corps, losses (killed, wounded, and missing) amounted to 40,103 
soldiers and officers. And this was only during the first three days of fighting. This study 
does not say anything about the losses of other Russian units – for example the regiments 
subordinate to the 1st Army, which fought in the Borzymów region, after: A. Незнамов, 
Cтратегический очерк войны 1914–1918, cz. 3, Москва 1922, s. 62.
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poisonous gases that emerged from its interior until the end of the War, 
were accompanying misfortunes that have been wandering the world 
until today and plaguing people: mass death and individual dramas of 
the victims of poisonous substances.
Initially, the German army used chlorine as a „panacea” to get out 
of the trench war drama. The scientist Fritz Haber (1867–1934) was an 
advocate, initiator and facilitator the modus operandi of using the „deadly 
potential” of poisonous clouds. Haber, a German of Jewish descent, 
born in Wrocław (German: Breslau) was a brilliant chemist who quickly 
gained a decisive voice in the domain of developing and using „dirty 
weapons”21. It was he who promoted chlorine as the most effective combat 
agent available at that time and possible to implement on the battlefield. 
Initially, Haber wanted to fill artillery shells with chlorine, in the same way 
as the tear-inducing and other irritant gases that were very intensively 
being experimented with on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1914/1915. 
However, the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) command refused to provide 
him with the number of missiles he needed22. Haber devised, immediately 
designed and implemented a different method of damaging the enemies 
of the German forces with volatile poisonous substances. His idea to solve 
the technical limitations was the „wave attack” method23, also described in 
the literature as a „gas cloud attack”24.
The first time a wave attack using volatile chlorine was used on the 
Western Front was in the Ypres area in Flanders (Belgium). The attack of 
22 April 1915 was preceded by long preparations25. From mid-January, the 
Germans began to form a new unit to service the new weapons. Initially, 
it was a 500-person Pionier-Regiment No. 3526. The regiment was also 
described as Gasregiment Peterson27. To mask the actual function of this 
21  Fritz Haber was also the first to synthesize ammonia from nitrogen and hydrogen, 
which was appreciated by awarding him the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1918.
22  M. Hoffmann, Wspomnienia. Wojna wśród niewyzyskanych sposobności, 1925 [Reprint, 
Oświęcim 2013], s. 60.
23  Z. Bartel, op. cit., s. 12.
24  M. Wścieklica-Pollak, Broń chemiczna. Słownik polsko–francusko–niemiecko–rosyjski, 
Warszawa 1932, s. 43.
25  R. Bille, Ieper – Ypres 1914–1918. La guerre chimique dans la region, Wervik 2003. 
26  There were pioneer battalions and independent companies in the German army that 
performed engineering and construction tasks – engineering troops analogous to those in 
the Entente armies. There were also troops of Assault Pioneers – equipped with equipment 
to remove wire entanglements, explosives to blow up fortifications, and special troops of 
assault pioneers equipped with flame throwers. The pioneer regiment in the German army 
was such an unusual formation that often commanders, in whose section the Gas Regiment 
appeared, called it a battalion. 
27  R. Hanslian, Der deutsche gasangriff bei Ypern am 22. April 1915, Berlin 1934, s. 13.
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regiment, it was referred to as Pionierkommando or Desinfektionstruppe 
Peterson28. By April 1915, the regiment was expanded and consisted of 
3 battalions, 3 companies each and a logistics company. It also included 
a field meteorological unit (Feldwetterstation) and a radio communication 
unit. In total, around 1,600 soldiers and officers served in it.
Already in the course of preparations for the attack on Ypres, the German 
command decided to create another „gas regiment”. This regiment was the 
36th Pioneer Regiment (Pionier-Regiment No. 36), initially commanded by 
Colonel von Goslich. The composition and organization of the regiment 
were the same as those of the 35th Pioneer Regiment, but the spatial scope 
of the operation differed; it was to serve on the Eastern Front.
THE FIRST WAVE ATTACK ON THE EASTERN FRONT OF THE GREAT WAR,  
31 MAY 1915
The first wave attack using poisonous chlorine on the Eastern Front 
was carried out by the German army on 31 May 1915 around 2:30 am on 
a fairly wide stretch of the front, covering most of the area of the Bolimów 
bridgehead. The timing of the beginning of the attack depended on the laws 
of physics, meteorological and terrain conditions that would determining 
the process of formation of deadly clouds and the combat concentration of 
poison29. The release of volatile gas from approximately 12,000 cylinders 
resulted in a poisonous cloud formation.
The German army deployed the cylinders over a distance of 
12 kilometres (in a straight line). In the section from the vicinity of the 
settlement of Majdan Bolimowski (in the south) through the villages of 
Wola Szydłowiecka, Humin, Borzymów, Sucha to Zakrzew (in the north), 
the soldiers placed groups of 10–12 cylinders in batteries along the trench 
line at irregular distances from each other (from a few to even 50 metres), in 
places considered the most convenient. They made the selection of places 
dependent on the spatial relationship between the positions occupied by 
the Russian and German troops. The smaller the width of the so-called 
„No man’s land”30, the closer was the distance between the batteries. After 
the gas cloud had passed through, the German army units assigned to this 
28  The unit was named after the unit commander, Colonel Otto Peterson, see: L.F. 
Haber, The poisonous clouds, Oxford 2002, s. 30.
29  Z. Bartel, op. cit., s. 35, 48–49.
30  A.I. Zalewska, J. Czarnecki, An Archaeology of ‘No Man’s Land’. The Great War in 
Central Poland, w: Rediscovering the Great War. Archaeology and Enduring Legacies on the Soča 
and Eastern Fronts, red. U. Košir, M. Črešnar, D. Mlekuž, Routledge 2019, s. 122–139.
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task started the assault. However, the attack did not develop as expected. 
The storm troopers were stopped by the dense fire of small arms and 
machine guns from the Russian side. The German command, convinced 
by this of the ineffectiveness of the use of gas, stopped the attack and 
ordered the troops to return to their starting positions31.
German documentation from spring 1915 on the results of the gas 
warfare, including the casualties of the first night attack on the Eastern 
Front, is very sparse. The sources show that the German command not 
only immediately after the release of the poison, but also long after that, 
had absolutely no knowledge of the size of the losses inflicted by the lethal 
chlorine on the Russian troops that had been hit by it.
Recently, it has become possible to at least partially supplement and 
verify the figures relating to the death rate of the victims of the use of 
poisonous chlorine by the German army in 1915, taking into account Russian 
data. This is due to the digitization and partial disclosure by the Russian 
State Military and Historical Archives [Российский государственный 
военно-исторический архив, hereinafter РГВИА] of Russian archival 
documents on the portal dedicated to the memory of the heroes of the 
Great War 1914–1918 („Памяти героев Великой войны 1914–1918”)32. 
The Russian source data that I have identified are more complete than the 
German ones, but they also do not contain any content that would allow 
for a precise and unambiguous determination of the number of human 
losses due to gas. In turn, in studies prepared immediately after World 
War I and in later times, one can find various estimates of numbers of 
losses caused by the first gas attack on the Eastern Front, carried out on 
31 May 1915.
The following sources are particularly important in the context of the 
problem discussed here:
– logs of combat operations of individual units taking part in the battles 
in the Bzura and Rawka areas (unfortunately, at the moment this resource 
is incomplete);
– post-factum reports in the days following the gas attack by 
commanders of certain units, and
– containing brief descriptions of some battles applications (for the 
awarding of decorations to soldiers who, despite the action of gas, stopped 
the attack of German troops);
31  Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München – Geheimes Hausarchiv [dalej: BayHStA], nr 239, 
s. 175. 
32  Portal www.gwar.mil.ru.
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In the critical use of these sources, it is necessary to take into account 
the dynamics of the situation and the chaos that arose after the passage of 
the lethal chlorine cloud. Secondly, the researcher must take into account 
the conditions of a specific combat situation (soldiers of various sub-
units and various regiments fought and died in one section) and also the 
process of the evacuation of the wounded and the dead during the said 
situation. Unfortunately, as one can read in some documents, it was often 
impossible to identify the victims, or even locate them. 
Below I present selected detailed data confirming the thesis that the 
issue of the countability of human victims of the use of gas in 1915 by 
the German army is very problematic and that they have still not been 
finally counted either in the first or in the subsequent gas attacks that took 
place in the area of today’s Poland in 191533.
SELECTED HISTORICAL STUDIES CONTAINING DATA ON HUMAN LOSSES 
IN THE GAS ATTACK ON 31 MAY 1915 IN THE 1920S AND 1930S
The main group of studies on which many modern historians still base 
their opinions on this matter are the publications of Russian and German 
researchers written up to 20 years after the end of the Great War. In these 
studies, the estimates of the gas casualties vary and refer (sometimes only 
casually) especially to the first attack of May 31, while briefly mention 
33  Recently, Nikolai Postnikov has made another attempt to count the victims of the 
gas attacks in his article on new data on the first wave gas attacks on the Eastern Front of 
World War I (May–June 1915). The author of this article bases his analysis on Rossiyskiy 
Gosudarstvennyy Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Arkhiv [dalej: RGVIA] source data, probably 
using the archive of collections physically available in the reading room, not available to me 
at the moment. Hence, there may be differences between his and my calculations. From my 
perspective, it is reasonable to treat the results of this researcher’s investigations and mine 
as complementary, not exclusive or competing. N. Postnikow does not question the figures 
given by De Lazari, but, it is worth appreciating, he also takes into account the calculations 
of gas losses based on other sources, including in the report of the Chief of the Medical 
Department of the Staff of the 2nd Army, Maj. Gen. A. de Roberti, 30/31 June 1915 (s. 92, 95, 
103). At the same time, his analysis did not take into account some of the source documents 
that, in my opinion, are very important for the issue of the number of victims of the use of 
combat gases, which I refer to in this article. According to the data collected by Postnikov, 
on 31 May 1915, the Russians lost 8,932 soldiers and officers poisoned with gas, including 
1,101 fatalities (p. 92), see: Н.Д. Постников, Новые данные о первых газобаллонных атаках 
на восточном фронте первой мировой войны (май-июнь 1915 г.), „Вестник Московского 
государственного областного университета. Серия: История и политические науки” 
2020, 2, s. 87–110. 
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(or don’t mention at all) the other two wave attacks that the German side 
made in June and July 1915 also on the Bolimów bridgehead.
Contemporary researchers of the early history of the use of chemical 
weapons on a mass scale often refer to a comprehensive study by Rudolf 
Hanslian, which appeared in print in 1925 under the meaningful title 
Chemical War. Referring to the 31 May attack, Hanslian recorded the losses 
of only one division, the Siberian one, where 9,000 soldiers were affected 
by poison gas, 6,000 of whom died34.
Another German researcher, Prof. Julius Meyer wrote twelve years 
later that as a result of the gas attack near Bolimów on 31 May 1915, „6,000 
Siberian shooters were suffocated and 3,100 poisoned”. Meyer also made 
a not very precise calculation from which it transpires that that for each 
gas cylinder there was „0.76 killed enemy”35 and noted that as a result of 
this attack, as many as 15,000 Russian men were taken prisoner that day. 
This latter information is not confirmed by German or, what is even more 
significant, Russian source documents. At the same time, both researchers 
remained silent in their publications on the victims of the night gas attack 
on the German side. This is particularly surprising, especially in relation 
to the latter publication.
In turn, from the eighth part of the official publication of the Reich 
Archives World War 1914–1918, published exactly a decade later (1935), we 
can learn more about the gas attacks in the area of the Bolimów bridge, but 
little about the number of gassed people36. The only mention of the Russian 
losses of 31 May is that, according to the testimony of Russian prisoners of 
war, 1,200 people died on the spot and 3,100 were poisoned37. These data 
are incomplete. We also find in this work the official figures concerning 
German losses (that it seems are based on documents), which amounted to 
374 soldiers and officers, and there is also talk of the victims of their own gas. 
34  R. Hanslian, F. Bergenroff, Der chemische Krieg, Berlin 1925, s. 68. It should also 
be added that in the light of the available Russian documents and studies, the Russian 
fatalities quoted by Hanslian are greatly overestimated. The problem of overestimating 
the number of gas victims has already been accurately discussed, for example, by M.V. 
Supotnicki, in the commentary to the reprint of the work by Aleksander N. De-Lazari cf. 
also M.B. Супотницкий, Забытая химическая война, http://www.supotnitskiy.ru/book/
book5_kommentarii1_10.htm [dostęp: 31 V 2021]. J. Main also refers to the problem J. 
Main, op. cit., s. 131–132.
35  J. Meyer, Der Gaskampf und die chemischen Kampstoffe, Leipzig 1938, s. 213.
36  Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918, Berlin 1935 contains information (Achter (8.) Band) about 
three gas attacks in the region of today’s Poland, that is, apart from the May one, attacks on 
12 June and 6 July 1915. 
37  Der Weltkrieg, s. 135.
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The study contains information about 56 soldiers „poisoned with gas”38, but 
nothing was mentioned about the cases of fatal gas poisoning, for which 
there are confirmations in the sources (which I write about below).
Also in Soviet Russia after the War there were reports of gas use during 
the Great War, although, for example, in the multi-volume publication 
Strategic outline of the war (Стратегический очерк войны), which can be 
treated as an equivalent of the German Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918, the attacks 
of May, June and July 1915 were not mentioned at all.
Already in 1935, the work (Xимическое оружие на фронтах Мировой 
Войны 1914–1918 гг.) of Alexander Nikolaevich De Lazari (1880–1942) on 
chemical weapons on the fronts of the World War 1914–1918 was published. 
It contains the first, relatively detailed, Russian data on the course of gas 
attacks and the number of their victims39. De Lazari emphasizes that his 
calculations concerning the event of the 31 May gas attack extend to 3 June 
1915. Thus, it draws attention to a very important problem, namely that after 
the attack on 31 May, there were still new cases of gas poisoning, for example 
in the trenches of the first line manned by reserve units, where gas lingered 
in shelters and dugouts and in the so-called „Gas swamps”, wet depressions 
of the ground, both in the forest and in the open. The accuracy of these data 
indicates that De Lazari used archival sources, including logs of combat 
operations of individual units. For many years, this publication was a key, 
though little-known, Russian source of data on the events on the Eastern 
Front in 1915. As De Lazari calculated, between 31 May and 3 June 1915, there 
were 9,038 soldiers and officers poisoned with chlorine, including 1,183 who 
died on the spot. As this study was created in the 1930s and was based on 
original documents, it may be considered as the most credible40. 
The regimental histories of German units are another group of published 
and publicly available secondary studies that contain information about 
the gas attacks discussed here and the human losses caused by them. These 
publications were created on the basis of source documents of individual 
units, as well as utilising the memories of the soldiers and officers serving 
in them. In the present paper I refer to the history of the regiments fighting 
on the Bolimów bridgehead in 1915. Some of these studies contain figures 
on losses to the German units as a result of the action of chlorine on the 
Russian opponents. As an example, I will mention the numbers included in 
38  Ibidem, s. 134.
39  A.H. Де Лазари [Aleksandr Nikolaevich De Lazari] – a lieutenant colonel of the 
General Staff of the Russian Empire, one of the first commanders of the Red Army, is seen 
as the first historian of the Chemical Defense Forces.
40  The figures given by De Lazari cannot be verified without full access to the Russian 
archives.
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the description of the course of the gas attack on 31 May 1915 in the history 
of the 225th Reserve Infantry Regiment [Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment, 
hereinafter RIR]. This unit manned positions in the forest south-west of the 
village of Wola Szydłowiecka in the direction of villages Majdan Bolimowski 
and Mogiły (today Joachimów Mogiły). The unknown author (authors?) of 
the chronicle noted that as a result of an accident, during the attack with the 
use of poisonous chlorine gas cylinders, 23 soldiers of this regiment were 
poisoned, including 1 fatally. In the same event, 2 soldiers of the 36th Pioneer 
Regiment (known as the Gaspionier-Regiment) also died. It was this unit that 
was responsible for the operation of gas cylinders on the Rawka and Bzura 
bridgehead, their proper location and for opening the valves41.
After the gas cloud had passed, the 227th RIR was to strike in the second 
wave of the attack by the German infantry. After the cancellation of the 
attack, its soldiers returned to their starting positions, and the history of 
this regiment records that it was later „heard” that the gas had disastrous 
consequences among the Russians and only a few riflemen remained alive 
in their trenches42.
The author of the chronicle of the 226th RIR also wrote about these 
later „rumors” about the extent of human losses in the Russian army. This 
regiment took positions in the area of the village of Wola Szydłowiecka 
and was to attack the Russian positions in the first wave, immediately after 
the gas cloud had passed. However, due to heavy fire from the Russian 
army, the attack did not take place. At first, the soldiers of the German 
army thought that the gas had not worked, and it was only in July, during 
the march to Warsaw, that they found out that the Russians had indeed 
suffered huge losses: „The gas cloud of 31 May, which did not cause 
heavy losses on the Russian front, must have had disastrous consequences 
further behind. Because during the march through Żyrardów, in July, we 
found a cemetery with the inscription on its entrance gate: <<Here lie 5,000 
Russians murdered by the Germans with gas>>”43.
In the course of searching the documentation conducted as part of the 
archaeological and historical research on the eastern front, I analyzed both 
German and Russian documents. Below, are presented selected source 
data from them on human losses resulting from the gas attacks on the 
Bolimów bridgehead in 1915 and subsequent studies on this subject, which 
41  Kriegsgeschichte des Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 225 nach Aufzeichnungen aus dem 
Felde, Gorlitz 1928, s. 67. For a more general discussion of the nature and activities of the 
Gaspionier-Regiment, see: S. Kaliński, Bolimów; A.I. Zalewska, J. Czarnecki, Ślady.
42  F. Giese, Geschichte des Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments 227 im Weltkriege 1914/18, [b.m.w.] 
1931. 
43  W. Rohkohl, Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 226, teil 1, Oldenburg–Berlin 1923, s. 72. 
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I treat as elements of the justification of the thesis on the impossibility of 
calculating the number of the victims of chemical weapons in 1915 on the 
Eastern Front. Also, I personally treat them also as a motivation to make 
– through the archaeological process – the sites of these events material 
testimonies and motives for reflection.
SOURCE DATA FROM GERMAN ARCHIVES
I found significant, although very laconic data on the preparations 
for the attack, its course and consequences in the „Journal of Combat 
Operations of the 9th Army”44. Only the following entry applies to the 
problem of human losses: „Units with hand grenades went into battle, but 
they fell under heavy enemy fire. Unexpected losses have been recorded”45.
There is nothing more. No numerical data are given. Another important 
source of information on the topic under study are the diaries of the 
commander-in-chief of the 9th Army (from April 1915), Prince Leopold 
of Bavaria. Although he wrote quite extensively about the attack itself, as 
well as about his disappointment with the apparent poor „effectiveness” 
of chlorine on the Rawka and Bzura bridgehead, he only mentioned the 
German losses in one sentence: „It was particularly painful for me that this 
first opportunity to perform a major act of war was a disastrous failure; 
and about 500 soldiers were sacrificed unnecessarily, but that could not 
be changed”46. 
SOURCE DATA FROM RUSSIAN ARCHIVES
When we analyze the number of victims of the gas attack of 31 May 
1915, documents and early studies of this problem in Russian shed 
light on human losses, especially among the Russian troops. Among 
other things, they relate to the units that manned the front line and that 
suffered the most severe losses from the effects of chlorine47. Much of 
the documentation and data that I am presenting in this part and which 
concern the Russian losses of 31 May 1915 are published in scientific 
circulation for the first time and had not been included in the previous 
44  BArch PH 5-II/281.
45  BArch PH 5-II/282.
46  BayHStA nr 239, s. 175.
47  This is confirmed, among other things, by the content of the study by А.Н. Де 
Лазари, op. cit.
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discussion of the problem48. This includes in particular dispatches sent 
by telegraphy by commanders of various ranks, extracts from the logs 
of combat operations of individual regiments affected by the gas attack 
and reports of doctors working in, or visiting, field hospitals in the area 
affected by the use of gas, as well as memories of eyewitnesses of those 
events. From my perspective, these previously omitted source materials 
deserve attention and further in-depth, comprehensive research. It should 
also be noted that the information they contain is not easy to use, these 
documents contain figures that are not necessarily always accurate, and in 
some cases, they are even contradictory.
For example, in the „Log of combat operations of the 53rd Regiment 
of Siberian Riflement” there are no precise data on the losses. It only 
says that the unit lost three quarters of its personnel, and after 31 May, 
the number of those who survived was sufficient to create only one 
battalion49. The exact numbers are included in the message from 31 (18) 
May 1915 at 22:00. It shows that the regiment lost 2,568 killed and 
wounded soldiers and 21 officers: „14 officers and 682 soldiers remained 
in the 53rd Regiment”50.
Another document is the dispatch of 1 June (19 May) 1915, at 12:40. 
It contains information that the 53rd Siberian Regiment lost 2,610 killed 
and wounded, including: 700 officers and soldiers who died as a result of 
the gas, and 1,828 officers and soldiers were poisoned51. Meanwhile, in the 
report from the battles prepared by the regiment’s adjutant on 31 (18) May 
191552, we learn that there were about 2,500 gas casualties among soldiers, 
including 600 killed on the spot, and 12 officers, 5 of whom died53.
From archival documents and De Lazari’s description54, we learn, 
among other things, that the devastation caused by the gas had several 
stages. It had the most lethal effect on soldiers immediately after its release, 
48  N. Postnikov published his article in 2020 and although he analyzed many important 
archives unavailable to me, he did not analyze or cite some of the documents and figures, 
important in my opinion, for the assessment of Russian losses (e.g., data on losses of the 
54th and 56th Siberian Rifle Regiments).
49  Журнал военных действий 53-го Сибирского стрелкового полка с 1 мая по 27 июня 
1915 года. RGVIA, фонд [dalej: f.] 3387, опис [dalej: op.] 1, дело [dalej: d.] 39.
50  It is a cable summarizing the losses suffered on the entire gas front on 31 May 1915. 
RGVIA, f. 2019, op. 1, d. 81.
51  Ibidem.
52  The account is undated, but in the same set of documents as the „Log of Combat 
Operations”, so it may be assumed that it was written immediately after the events 
described there. 
53  Реляция о боевых действиях 53-го Сибирского стрелкового полка 18 мая 1915 года. 
RGVIA, f. 3387, op. 1, d. 39.
54  А.Н. Де Лазари, op. cit., s. 29.
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but it also accumulated in the hollows of the Russian trenches and in other 
depressions of the terrain behind the front line (see the mention of the „gas 
muds” above) and caused losses among Russian soldiers even three days 
after the German gas attack. 
For example, in the „Journal of the military operations of the 54th 
Siberian Regiment” under the date 2 June (20 May) 1915, it was written: 
„During those days, there were still cases of sickness due to the action of 
poisonous gases (...) there were especially many of them in the 2nd battalion 
of the 53rd Siberian Rifle Regiment, which was in our regiment’s reserve. By 
the evening of 20 May (2 June 2), there were only 66 people left in it”55.
According to De Lazari, the units that suffered the most severe losses 
from the chlorine attack on 31 May 1915 were the regiments of the 14th 
Siberian Rifle Division, where 6,000 soldiers and 50 officers were injured 
by the chlorine attack. De Lazari’s calculations of losses include the 53rd, 
54th, 55th and 56th Siberian Rifle Regiments as well as the 1st and 4th 
companies (sotnias) of the 45th Don Cossack Regiment56. Unfortunately, 
he does not refer in detail to any possible human losses of other units, 
which could also have been incurred as a result of the action of gases57. In 
the units listed by De Lazari, the gas losses can be described as enormous. 
The 53rd Siberian Rifle Regiment alone lost 3127 soldiers and 17 officers. 
This constituted 96.2% of the original number of soldiers and 48.6% of the 
number of officers58. This observation is important because in the available 
archival documents we find quite contradictory data.
I see the above compilations based on selected archival documents as 
representative of a wide range of problems faced previously and still faced 
by all those who tried to quantify the human losses resulting from the use 
of chlorine in 1915. The main ones are the inaccuracy and imprecision of 
the currently available figures.
The problem of imprecise figures is also well illustrated by the source 
material relating to the 55th Siberian Rifle Regiment. The regiment’s 
combat log shows that as a result of the German chlorine attack on 31 May, 
the regiment lost 359 killed and 2048 poisoned soldiers, as well as 3 killed 
55  Журнал военных действий 54-го Сибирского стрелкового полка за период с 1-го мая 
по 30-е июня 1915 г. RGVIA, f. 3388, op. 1, d. 39.
56  This number does not appear in De Lazari’s count. I established it on the basis of 
other archival documents, i.e.: in the message summarizing the losses suffered as a result 
of the gas attack on 31 (18) May 1915, there was a note about the losses of 5 officers and 101 
Cossacks in the 45th Don Cossack Regiment. 
57  I draw attention to this, in particular, the omission in the calculations of subunits of 
sappers or artillery as well as units operating at the rear of the front line.
58  А.Н. Де Лазари, op. cit., s. 29.
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and 14 poisoned officers59. Meanwhile, a dispatch from 31 (18) May at 
22:00 shows that this regiment lost 2,348 soldiers and 21 officers60.
The problem of imprecise numerical data is, for example, well-
illustrated by the available source material relating to the 54th Siberian 
Rifle Regiment. In the log of combat operations of this regiment, we find 
no records of human losses at all. This could be explained by the fact that 
during the attack on 31 May 1915, this regiment was in reserve. But the 
error of such a simplified inference is illustrated by the above-quoted 
dispatch from 31 (18) May 1915 at 22:00. It shows that the 54th Siberian 
regiment had lost 150 soldiers and 1 officer as a result of the chlorine 
attack. The cable does not specify how many of them were killed outright 
and how many had been poisoned with gas, which additionally confirms 
the existence of the problem of unreliable data.
Among the regiments included in De Lazari’s list, it is also worth 
referring to the data on the 56th Siberian Rifle Regiment. This regiment 
suffered relatively few losses as a result of the action of gas on 31 May 
1915, but in the Military Operations Log of this particular unit, we find 
evidence that is very important for the analysis conducted here, that the 
gas retained its poisonous properties even eight kilometres from the front 
line. As we read in the report from the fighting on 31 (18) May 1915, the 
56th Siberian Regiment, which was in reserve that day and stationed in 
the villages of Czerwona Niwa and Aleksandrów, had 7 soldiers heavily 
poisoned with chlorine while still in the camp and 54 lightly poisoned61. 
This is important information indicating the power of volatile chlorine, 
and indirectly the need to include in the estimates the victims of this 
poison who were also apparently not involved in combat situations.
Other information important for the analysis of the source material 
are the references to human losses in the 55th Infantry Division. In De 
Lazari’s opinion, these losses were less severe than in the 14th Siberian 
Division. This division lost a total of 3,070 soldiers and 26 officers. This 
may be due to the fact that it was mainly the 217th Kowrowski Infantry 
Regiment that was exposed to chlorine, and they were covering the section 
from the southern end of the Humin village to the forest edge south of 
Wola Szydłowiecka. This area was particularly interesting for me, because 
it was in this section that we discovered and documented a forgotten 
war cemetery (probably of the 217th Kowrowski Infantry Regiment) and 
59  Описание участия в боях 55-го Сибирского полка с 1-го мая по 30-е июня 1915 
г. RGVIA, f. 3389, op. 1, d. 51.
60  RGVIA, f. 2019, op. 1, d. 81.
61  Копия из журнала военных действий за время боев с 1-го мая по 1-е июля 1915 
года. RGVIA, f. 3390, op. 1, d. 23.
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a common grave where the fallen soldiers of the Tsarist army are buried 
together. Both burial sites required interpretation to prove their status and 
the need for their protection62. Unfortunately, the soldiers who rest there 
remain anonymous.
The issue of the anonymity of the victims of chemical weapons deserves 
a separate discussion63. Here I am just signalling that this is a problem 
that has accumulated and almost constantly has been becoming more 
complicated for over a hundred years. I will illustrate it with data relating 
to the 217th Infantry Regiment. According to De Lazari, this regiment 
lost 16 officers and 2,147 soldiers to the use of poisonous chlorine. This 
number coincides with that given in the Regiment’s Combat Operations 
Log, where it was recorded that in the gas attack on 31 May, the poisonous 
cloud injured 15 officers and 2,147 soldiers. However, the diary does not 
detail how many of them were poisoned with chlorine and how many 
were killed by it. As the chronicler of this regiment wrote on 1 June (19 
May) 1915: „All those killed, and poisoned with gas, were moved to the 
cemetery at the end of the village of Wola Szydłowiecka, not far from 
the headquarters of the regiment. At the cemetery, attempts were made 
to establish the identity of the dead, but, apart from a few, there was no 
possibility of doing so. One common grave was dug, and 201 bodies were 
buried there. Only 55 people were identified from among those buried”64.
In turn, a dispatch sent from the command of the 2nd Army of the 
Russian Empire on 31 May at 22:00 states that the losses in this regiment 
are not fully explained and that about half of its soldiers died, „that is, 
about 1,800 privates and 6 officers”65.
62  A.I. Zalewska, G. Kiarszys, Absent presence of Great War cemeteries in the municipality 
of Bolimów, Central Poland, w: The Materiality of Troubled Pasts: Archaeologies of Conflicts 
and Wars, red. A.I. Zalewska, J.M. Scott, G. Kiarszys, Warszawa–Szczecin 2017, s. 55–81; 
Archeologia frontu wschodniego jako wyzwanie, red. A.I. Zalewska (w druku).
63  Undoubtedly, some of the victims can be identified by name thanks to the resources 
of the archive https://gwar.mil.ru/. I have made such an effort and I am in the process of 
carrying out this task. It is so complicated that my goal is not to conduct polemics with 
outstanding researchers over the number of fallen, but to reach as complete name lists 
as possible in connection with specific cemeteries and war graves, and unfortunately (as 
shown by the results of archaeological research) with non-cemetery sites of fallen soldiers, 
including victims of chemical weapons, in the area of Bzura and Rawka. The e-repository of 
knowledge, about the legitimacy of creating about which I wrote above, could undoubtedly 
contribute to the implementation of this and this type of goals.
64  Журнал военных действий 217-го пехотного Ковровского полка с 1 мaя 1915 г. по 31 
мaя 1915 г. RGVIA, f. 2830, op. 1, d. 28. The document lists the surnames of the identified 
soldiers. In my opinion, these soldiers deserve commemoration by their full name. 
65  RGVIA, f. 2019, op. 1, d. 81.
COUNTLESS AND UNCOUNTABLE (?) VICTIMS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, MAY 1915 301
DOI: 10.17951/rh.2021.52.281-311
Further positions (south-west of Wola Szydłowiecka) were occupied by 
the 218th Gorbatovski Infantry Regiment; the data show that it was least 
affected by the lethal effects of gas. Why? Our findings so far based on 
archaeology and remote sensing data66 show that most of the defence lines 
of this regiment were located in heavily forested areas, which resulted in 
the chlorine cloud spreading differently there than in the open. Moreover, 
analysis of written sources, and more specifically, the content of the 
German regimental history of the 225th RIR, indicates that in the section 
occupied by this regiment, not all chlorine cylinder valves were opened, 
so the gas cloud did not cover the entirety of this section of the front line67.
According to De Lazari, the 218th Infantry Regiment lost 9 officers 
and 894 soldiers, a total of 903 gas casualties. However, according to the 
Military Operations Journal, in the gas attack on 31 May 1915, the regiment 
lost 195 soldiers and officers killed by the gas and 689 chlorine-poisoned 
soldiers and officers, a total of 884 gas victims68. From the telegram of 
31 (18) May 2015 at 22:00 relating to the 218th Regiment, it appears that it 
lost 1 officer and 730 soldiers, without specifying the number of wounded 
and killed.
That the data on human casualties due to the use of chlorine is 
incomplete can also be determined indirectly. For example, we may 
take the case of the 219th Kotelnicki Infantry Regiment, the soldiers of 
two battalions who manned the trenches of the decimated 217th Infantry 
Regiment on 31 May 1915. Yet, inexplicably, no losses are recorded among 
them in the Log of Combat Operations, nor in the available dispatches of 
31 May and the following days. The same is the case with the data relating 
to the 220th Skopinski Infantry Regiment, who occupied the section of the 
front beyond the immediate reach of the gas cloud. Neither the combat log 
of this regiment nor the dispatches from the battlefield mentions losses in 
this unit. However, bearing in mind the range of „effective” gas operation, 
it should be assumed that human losses in this unit could also have been 
serious.
Summing up the data from the official documents that I have examined 
so far, it appears that as a result of the German gas attack on 31 May 1915, 
between 8,092 to 8,377 soldiers and officers were killed and poisoned 
with gas. These data refer to the human casualties of both divisions 
mentioned above, including infantry and cavalry units manning the 
66  A.I. Zalewska, J. Czarnecki, G. Kiarszys, Krajobraz Wielkiej Wojny. Front nad Rawką 
i Bzurą (1914–1915) w świetle teledetekcji archeologicznej i źródeł historycznych, Warszawa 2019. 
67  Kriegsgeschichte, s. 67.
68  Журнал военных действий 218 Пехотного Горбатовского полка с 1 мaя 1915 г. по 31 
мaя 1915. RGVIA, f. 2831, op. 1, d. 37.
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first line of trenches and units in reserve. It should be emphasized here 
that the currently available source data do not show losses in artillery 
units or in support units (e.g., among sappers), which further makes it 
difficult to provide more precise figures69. De Lazari mentions losses in 
these formations in his calculations. Moreover – as I wrote above, the data 
presented by A.N. De Lazari include gas poisoning not only on 31 May, 
but also on the following days – up to and including 3 June 1915. This 
explains the fact that his data on losses give a total that is higher than 
the data resulting from the compilation of numerical data from dispatches 
and logs of combat operations of the individual units alone70.
The data in some combat logs and dispatches support the validity of 
expanding the pool of figures that should be taken into account in the 
estimation of these figures, including the factors taken into account by De 
Lazari (such as gas-induced human losses several days after the attack). 
For example, the account of the fighting of the 56th Siberian Regiment 
does not contain any information about cases of sickness or gas poisoning 
after the filling of the trench lines previously occupied by the 55th Siberian 
Regiment. Only in the summary of losses incurred from 31 (18) May to 
12 June (30 May) 1915, does this journal record human losses: 1 killed and 
3 injured officers, together with 23 killed and 189 wounded and injured 
soldiers71. The document does not specify which losses were caused by 
German artillery fire and which (if any) were due to the effects of gas. 
These calculations also do not include losses from 12 June (30 May) 1915 
– when the 56th Regiment was the subject of another German gas attack. 
OTHER ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS CONTAINING INFORMATION ABOUT 
THE VICTIMS OF THE GAS ATTACKS ON 31 MAY 1915
Important information helpful in estimating human losses as a result 
of the attack on May 31, 1915 is also included in the notes and documents 
drawn up by witnesses of those events who had contact with the victims of 
gas attacks shortly after they had occurred, e.g., in medical reports, diaries, 
memoires etc. The collection of documents drawn up directly during 
the fighting or even several months after the gas attacks is particularly 
69  N. Postnikov reports that artillery units of both these divisions lost about 236 
soldiers and officers as a result of the gas, see: Н.Д. Постников, Новые, s. 93.
70  The discrepancy in the data from archival documents and De Lazari’s study is 
explained in a similar way by N.D. Postnikov, see: ibidem, s. 92.
71  Копия из журнала военных действий за время боев с 1-го мая по 1-е июля 1915 года. 
RGVIA, f. 3390, op. 1, d. 23.
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informative. It includes reports of unit commanders, testimonies of 
soldiers and officers of these units, as well as reports of doctors who visited 
field hospitals receiving chlorine victims on the day of the gas attack or 
immediately after it. These documents were collected at the request of the 
Special Investigation Committee, examining cases of violations of military 
law and international law by the German army.
It is worth recalling as an example the data contained in the 
questionnaires completed by the commanders of units that were in the 
front line during the gas attacks in 1915–1916 and were exposed to gases. 
These documents are very laconic, and the numbers provided in them do 
not always correspond to the numbers contained, for example, in the logs of 
combat operations of individual units. Most often, they are given generally 
or collectively. This makes them not the best source material for assessing 
the losses suffered by the Russians as a result of the action of chlorine. 
For example, in the report on the losses of the 54th Siberian Regiment on 
31 May 1915, the commander of this regiment not only summarized the 
losses of several units in total, but also included the sum of losses from 
two gas attacks – carried out on 31 May and 12 June. According to this 
document, the 53rd, 54th and 55th Siberian regiments and the 2nd sotnia 
of the 45th Don Cossack Regiment – which were subjected to a gas attack 
on 31 May 1915, as well as the 24th, 54th and 56th Siberian regiments 
that suffered losses in the 12 June attacks, lost „from both of these events 
approximately 2,500 people killed; and 7,000 people poisoned”72.
Particularly informative data derive from the reports of doctors 
working (or supervising activities in the field of medical assistance) at 
dressing points and/or in field hospitals located at the rear of the front in 
the area where gas attacks had taken place, but also in medical facilities 
remote from the battlefield73.
In his report, A. I. Ignatowski, professor of medicine, mentioned 
12 hospitals and medical points in Warsaw and one of the hospitals in 
Żyrardów as those to which victims of gas weapons were taken after the 
attack on 31 May 1915. In all, 3,000 soldiers and 68 officers poisoned with 
gas were brought to these facilities on the day of the gas attack, of which 
101 soldiers and 5 officers had died by the end of the day74. Source criticism 
of another part of this interesting group of documents from which one may 
72  RGVIA, f. 13159, op. 1, d. 62.
73  Here, as a very valuable supplement to these data, we should treat these from the 
report of A.V. de-Roberti, head of the sanitary department and author of the official report 
for the Command of Maj. Gen. Of the 2nd Army, cited by N.D. Postnikov (Н.Д. Постников, 
Новые, see footnote 33 above). 
74  RGVIA, f. 13159, op. 1, d. 1.
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draw conclusions includes five reports of doctors working in the back-up 
military hospitals in the Teresin area, 16 kilometres from the battlefield. 
These reports date from 2 June (20 May) 191575. According to them, 9 officers 
and 1,574 soldiers poisoned with gas were brought to Teresin, where the 
Main Evacuation Point No. 3 and other hospitals and medical points were 
located, and on 31 May and 1 June, about 50 died of gas poisoning. Many 
remained in a severe or very severe state for a long time, due to damage or 
severe irritation to the upper and lower respiratory tract76.
As a result of being affected by gas, many soldiers died both directly 
on the battlefield and later. After chlorine vapours are absorbed by the 
human body, hydrochloric acid and hypochlorous acid are produced in 
the aqueous environment, which in turn releases active oxygen in the lung 
tissues77. Strong acids cause, among other things, thrombotic necrosis. This 
process is confirmed by the source documents.
For example, the report of the Doctor of Medicine D. M. Łavrow of 
11 June (29 May) 1915, shows that on 31 May, between 4:00 am and 5:00 
am, about 400 soldiers poisoned with gas were brought to the hospital in 
Teresin. Of these, 21 were already dead. By 7 p.m., another 27 soldiers had 
died in the hospital. On the same day, about 1,200 soldiers poisoned with 
gas were brought to hospital No. 3 in Guzów throughout the day (until 
midnight), of which 140 died immediately. That same night (1 June), Dr. 
Lavrov went to Żyrardów and found there that by 4 am, about 3,000 gas-
poisoned people had been admitted to the hospital, of which about 30% 
were in a serious condition. This hospital admitted another 1,000 chlorine-
poisoned soldiers by 1 p.m. on 1 June. This document does not contain data 
on the deceased in the hospital in Żyrardów. Doctor Lavrov also visited 
a dressing point in Radziwiłłów (than Staro Radziwiłłów) and wrote that 
from the morning of 31 May to the morning of 1 June about 1,900 people 
poisoned with gas were admitted, of which 135–140 died.
These data should not be mechanically added up, for a number of 
reasons. Among other things, it is not known if, and if so, how many 
poisoned patients were transferred from one facility to another. There are 
indications that the poisoned people who were transported directly from 
the battlefield to Guzów, Radziwiłłów or Teresin were then transported to 
hospitals in Żyrardów or Warsaw. It is also not clear whether the doctors 
who submitted the reports counted all poisoned soldiers who came to 
75  Ibidem.
76  C. Pałczyński, A. Krakowiak, Skutki ostrego narażenia na substancje toksyczne w układzie 
oddechowym. „Alergia” 2012, 3, s. 16–21.
77  Ibidem.
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a given hospital or dressing point, or only those who were temporarily 
detained and registered in a given facility. There is a possibility that some 
of the patients were immediately transported to Warsaw or Żyrardów 
from the railway stations in Teresin and Radziwiłłów. In addition, the 
reports of military medics presumably did not include mentions of all 
the facilities that provided aid to soldiers who were poisoned with gas, 
including hospitals that received them.
In none of the above reports, for example, was the hospital located in 
the convent of the Sisters of Nazareth in Szymanów (12 kilometres from 
the front) included. The nun keeping the chronicle of the monastery 
wrote78, among other things: „For several weeks our area has been flooded 
with the military, because the entire division has come here for a rest. The 
12th Infantry Regiment of Siberian Riflemen is stationed in Szymanów 
(...). The village and the manor house are full of soldiers, there is noise and 
constant disturbance everywhere. We live just like in a barracks”.
In the light of a note dated 31 May 1915, the poisoned soldiers were 
also sent there and received medical help and support from the Sisters. 
The Chronicle from Szymanów records: „Tonight we were awakened by 
the suffocating stench of the gases released by the Germans for the first 
time. Puffs of acrid blue smoke poured through the open windows; we 
hastened to close them as quickly as possible. The next day, the panic and 
rage at the Germans was enormous. There had been 6,000 soldiers lying in 
the trenches in a row”.
Important for understanding the scale of human losses is also the 
following entry on the victims of the May gas attack: „We got about 1,000 
victims – many die in agony, their lungs and insides burnt. The funeral 
of young officers is ceremoniously held. (...) A few days later, an even 
more solemn funeral of a dozen or so victims. A dozen or so biers without 
coffins decorated with greenery carried soldiers on stretchers...”79. From 
the chronicle we learn that the deceased soldiers were buried in the park 
around the monastery and in the nearby war cemetery, and in Teresin.
SUMMARY AND ESTIMATION OF CHLORINE GAS CASUALTIES ON 
THE EASTERN FRONT
The numbers of killed and chlorine-poisoned soldiers in the Russian and 
German armies still remain unclear and debatable. Researchers, whether 




writing right after World War I or in the following decades, delved into 
this topic, but did not leave indisputable, conclusive determinations as to 
the precise numbers of the fallen and gas-poisoned soldiers fighting on 
the Rawka and Bzura front that would take into account all three chlorine 
attacks carried out there by the German army in 1915. Currently, due to 
the passage of time and limitations of the resources of source documents 
(partially destroyed, partially dispersed in Russian, German and Polish 
archives and private collections), in my opinion, it is impossible to provide 
hard figures indicating the estimated number of victims of gas attacks on 
the Eastern Front, which does not mean that such attempts should be 
abandoned.
At present, it is possible to carry out at least collective recapitulations of 
the various source data and secondary studies available today. Therefore, 
the author does not claim to be able to present the final truths relating to 
the problems discussed here, but only seeks to strengthen the epistemic 
truth. Hence, the summary results of the estimation of the number of 
victims of the first three80 German gas wave attacks on the Eastern Front 
presented in this article are of the nature of an attempt in which the veracity 
of the statements should be defined rather in terms of being statements of 
current knowledge than as fully verified.
I have presented the conditions of verifiability above using the example 
of data relating to the gas attack of 31 May. The following estimation, total 
for three gas attacks, is the result of an analogical analysis of the source 
data relating to the next two wave attacks81 in the Bzura and Rawka 
80  N. Postnikov, in his otherwise very interesting article, using Russian archival 
documents, additionally indicates „a fourth wave of chlorine attack in the Bolimów 
region”. He claims that it took place on the night of 5–6 June 1915 in the section occupied 
by one of the battalions of the 14th Siberian Rifle Division. However, the author does not 
specify exactly where this additional attack would have taken place. Instead, he writes that 
the attack did not lead to any losses. I perceive the author’s thesis as highly debatable at the 
moment, as no German sources confirm this attack. The author also describes the gas attack 
that took place on 6 June in the area of the village of Konopnica near Rawa Mazowiecka. 
There, the Germans used chlorine released from specially modified flamethrowers, which 
is confirmed by other sources. The Russians lost 12 soldiers and one officer there. German 
sources also mention this attack, but the attack was not a wave attack. To carry out it, the 
Germans used a flamethrower or flamethrowers adapted for the dissemination of active 
substances – poisons. Therefore, in my opinion, it is not justified to equate it with the three 
situations of mass use of gas in combat situations that took place in May, June and July 
in this area. It is noteworthy that in 1915 the „gas psychosis” prevailed and the resulting 
source records may reflect that in suggesting that there had been more than three waves of 
attacks on the Bolimów bridgehead.
81  It is a fact, for example, that according to the entries in the Military Operations Log 
of the 9th Army (BArch 5-II/282), the fourth gas attack took place in the area of the Rawka 
and Bzura. The Germans carried it out in the vicinity of the village of Łady on the Vistula 
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regions, closely related to the initial attack on the Eastern Front. They took 
place on 12 June and 6 July 1915 in the Bzura and Rawka area82.
My calculations so far (for which I have found confirmation in the source 
data) showed that the minimum and estimated number of victims of the 
first three German wave attacks on the Eastern Front, carried out using the 
poisonous properties of chlorine, on the side of the Russian army ranges 
from 21,477 to 22,094 soldiers and officers. From the summary of the 
figures published by N.A. Postnikov, we get the number of gas casualties 
estimated at 30,278 soldiers and officers, fatally poisoned and poisoned 
with gas in the area of Rawka and Bzura in 191583.
The gas casualties on the side of the German army are probably no 
less than 1,812 people killed and poisoned with chlorine. These figures, 
although still debatable (rather, understated), show the deadly power of 
chlorine as the first weapon of mass destruction used on a massive scale 
and in combat situations on the Eastern Front.
This may be a warning that even active substances that are relatively 
primitive, easy to obtain and use as a weapon, such as the chlorine used 
in 1915, can cause in a short time large numbers of deaths and enormous 
suffering to people who came within their range of action, such as was the 
case at Ypres or Bolimów.
As a result of investigations relating to the victims of the use of chemical 
weapons on a massive scale on the Eastern Front, the reasons for the 
impossibility of accurately determining human losses were revealed. This 
problem emerged in a specific cognitive context, i.e., as a result of attempts 
to define and understand who was buried in numerous cemeteries and war 
graves established in 1915 in central Poland and why they remain forgotten. 
It seems, however, that the issue of the undefined number of victims of 
chemical weapons and their poor representativeness in historiography is 
of a nature that is broader than just idiographic. Determining the number 
River and it was a test of a gas attack over water. The attack was carried out on the Russian 
positions on the other side of the Vistula, in the area of Wyszogród. There is no mention of 
its effects in the Russian documents available today. This issue is worth discussing in more 
detail, but it goes beyond the issues presented in this article. 
82  More information on these attacks can be found in: S. Kaliński, Bolimów; A.I. 
Zalewska, J. Czarnecki, Ślady.
83  See: Н.Д. Постников, Новые. We know that this researcher did not include all the 
losses resulting from the source documents. Both of these calculations (my modest ones 
resulting from a very limited access to source data and those of N.A. Postnikov, who has, 
I assume, full access to the data collected in RGVIA), are still hypothetical. The estimates 
contained in this article, due to their vagueness, indirectly confirm the thesis about the 
incalculability of chemical weapons victims but contradict the sense of using the adjective 
„uncounted” in the title of this article.
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of human losses as a result of the use of poisonous chlorine in the first 
wave attack carried out on 31 May 1915 by the imperial army of Germany 
in today’s Poland is not the only challenge facing researchers of the effects 
of the use of chemical weapons in history.
By raising this problem, this article aims to indicate the urgent need 
and legitimacy of systematizing and interpreting the source data, helpful 
in specifying and commemorating the victims of chemical weapons, 
especially those considered undefined and uncountable, such as the 
victims of German chemical weapon wave attacks on the territory of today’s 
Poland. It would be helpful to create a digital repository of knowledge 
on the use of chemical weapons in the history of mankind, within which 
source evidence, written, iconographic, material, physicochemical, 
anthropological and other data could be integrated84. I hope that this 
article can contribute to ensuring that this legitimate step will come, 
taking into account the source data also from the Eastern Front of World 
War I, including those relating to the victims of the use of chlorine by the 
German Imperial army, 31 May 1915.
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84  I justify this need in more detail in other places, see: A.I. Zalewska, The Use of 
Chemical Weapons on the Eastern Front of World War One (1915) and its Material and Discursive 
Remains, „Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Archaeologica” 2020, 35, s. 243–273. 
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